Ich habe, mich niemals durch die Erklärung, welche die Logiker von einem Urteile überhaupt geben, befriedigen können: es ist, wie sie sagen, die Vorstellung eines Verhältnisses zwischen zwei Begriffen.
I have never been able to satisfy myself with the explanation that the logicians give of a judgement in general: it is, they say, the representation of a relation between two concepts.
I. Kant - Kritik der reinen Vernunft / Critique of Pure Reason
"Man kann Philosophen, die ihn nie kennengelernt haben, mit seinem Tonfall philosophieren hören; und Studenten, die kaum seinen Namen richtig schreiben können, rümpfen heute die Nase über Dinge, die er nicht mochte."
G. Ryle über L. Wittgenstein
Much philosophy of logic is shaped, explicitly or implicitly, by the thought that logic is distinctively formal and abstracts from material content. The distinction between formal and material does not appear to coincide with the more familiar contrasts between a priori and empirical, necessary and contingent, analytic and synthetic—indeed, it is often invoked to explain these. Nor, it turns out, can it be explained by appeal to schematic inference patterns, syntactic rules, or grammar. What does it mean, then, to say that logic is distinctively formal?
I believe in propositions and propositional content.
They are what you want to say but do not find the word for - not in any language.
They are what you remember someone telling you, without any information about how they said it or which words they used.
I see no problem in saying that a white chair is confirming the rule that all swans are black.
